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STUDENT NoTs 499
compensation with optional compensation as the only alternative.
Optional compensation, in turn, discriminates outrageously against
motorists as a class, since they pay compensation when not at fault,
and damages when they are at fault, with no offsetting benefits. The
argument is sound but the premise is wrong. A distinction is to be
noted between the kind of statute this contention is based on, and
the kind advocated by the majority of those who favor the plan. In
the former the taking out of insurance by every motorist is manda-
tory; while in the latter it is conditioned upon violation of some
motor car law, or upon being involved in an accident as provided by
the particular statute. No person is compelled to furnish security of
any kind until he has violated some provision of the statute. The
statute does not compel the motorist class as a whole to furnish se-
curity, but only those individuals who are violators of motor car laws
and are reckless in their driving. It is submitted that this is in no
way unjust or discriminatory.
Such a statute would act as a strong preventive of future acci-
dents. The average wage earning owner who is unable to afford insurance
would guard against careless or reckless driving, when he knows that
once he has been in an accident or has violated some motor car law
(as provided by the particular statute) he will be compelled to furnish
security or else be barred from the roads. Certainly even a slight re-
duction in the number of accidents causing loss of life and limb justi-
fies the increased burden placed upon the type of motorist the statute
would require to furnish security.
In summary there are two reasons for having such an act: (1)
protection of accident victims, (2) prevention of future accidents. Do
these two interests outweigh the slight increase in the burden placed
upon the motorist? The answer to this question must be in the affirm-
ative. In conclusion it is proposed that Kentucky adopt a statute
similar to that of Connecticut. There is no doubt as to the great need
when it is recalled that in Kentucky in 1923 there were only 166 auto
fatalities while in 1930 the number jumped to 514,-an increase of
over 200% in seven years. Certainly the present system of regulating
the matter in this State is antique in its methods and wholly inade-
quate to cope with the problem. EMERSON SALISBURY.
DOMESTIC RELATIONS: ADULTERY AS A GROUND FOR
DIVORCE.
A husband sued for divorce on the grounds of adultery. It ap-
peared that the wife had been guilty of adultery, but such had been
condoned by the husband by subsequent cohabitation. Thereafter she
again committed adultery. The court held that the second offense
revived the original cause of action, and that the husband was en-
titled to a divorce.1
15World's Almanac (1935 ed.) p. 858.
'Wagner v. Wagner, 130 Md. 346, 100 AtI. 364 (1917).
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Adultery is the voluntary sexual intercourse of a Married person
with a person other than the offender's husband or wife2 It was not,
by itself, indictable at common law,3 but was left to the ecclesiastical
courts for punishment. However, even in the English ecclesiastical
courts adultery was only a ground for divorce a mensa et thoro.' At
the present time in this country all forty-seven states which permit an
absolute divorce will grant it for adultery;5 as do Alaska, the District
of Columbia, and Hawaii.6 An absolute divorce is not permitted in
South Carolina.7
As to the number of acts of guilt necessary by either the husband
or -the wife in order to constitute adultery, the general rule is that
one is sufficient.8
According to the general interpretation of the present law it is
not necessary to prove the direct fact of adultery, for, being committed
in secrecy, it is seldom susceptible of proof except by circumstances,
which however are sufficient when they would lead the guarded discre-
tion of a reasonable and just man to a conclusion of guilt.' It is
frequently said by the courts that the circumstantial evidence must be
of a "clear and positive nature." 0 And'that a clear preponderance of
the evidence is sufficient.
In all cases there is a presumption of innocence which must be
overcome before adultery is proved."
In order to prove adultery by circumstantial evidence the con-
currence of both the disposition and opportunity must be shownm"
The general rule in the United States is that a divorce for adultery
will not be granted on the uncorroborated admissions of the defend-
ant." There are statutes in many states requiring the corroboration
of the complainant's testimony.u4
If the party committing the adultery was insane at the time of
committing the act it is no ground for a divorce.6 Adultery com-
mitted while intoxicated is, however, a ground for a divorce. 6
As to what constitutes a condonation of the offense of adultery
the authorities are to a degree in conflict. The general rule is that
2Bouvier, Law Dictionary.
3Wharton, Criminal Law, Sec. 1717.
4Madden on Persons and Domestic Relations (1931), 264-267.
5 Vernier, Am. Family Laws (1932), Vol. 11, p. 18.
S Supra, Note 4.
1 upra, Note 4.
8 Supra, Note 4.
9 Supra, Note 3.
1 OMarshall v. Marshall, 55 App. D. C. 173, 3 F. (2d) 344 (1925);
Brown v. Brown, 27 Idaho 205 (1915); Miller v. Miller, 94 W. Va. 177,
118 S. E. 137 (1923).
"Supra, Note 3.
2Supra, Note 3.
1" Supra, Note 3.
4 Local statutes should be consulted.
,6Supra, Note 3.
" Supra, Note 3.
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if either the husband or the wife condone the infidelity of the other
such infidelity cannot be set up as a ground for divorce, 7 for "he who
seeks equity must do equity." The weight of authority is that a con-
tinuance of cohabitation after knowledge of the commission of adultery
is a condonation of that offense.1 Some American courts use the term
cohabitation as including sexual intercourse;2 while the English courts
recognize the fact that there can be cohabitation without sexual inter-
course.
0 It is submitted that the English rule is the better rule.
If an act of adultery is condoned, and there is a renewal of the
marital status, and thereafter the offending spouse again commits an
act of adultery, it amounts to a revival of the original cause, and the
Injured party is entitled to a divorce on the grounds of adultery." It is
submitted that "condonation" is but a conditional forgiveness based
upon the future good behavior of the offending spouse.
The doctrine of connivance, which is based on the maxim volenti
-non fit injuria, is a good defense in a divorce action." Merely refrain-
ing from interfering with the commission of adultery by a suspected
spouse is not connivance."
Under the Kentucky statutes, section 2117, a single act of adultery
by the husband is not sufficient to entitle the wife to a divorce, since
the statute declares there shall be a living in adultery. The cases
bear out the statute in this respect.4 The wife must prove the husband
is living in adultery," but there need not be a living together con-
tinuously or for a given time.2 Under the same statute a single act
of adultery by the wife is sufficient to entitle the husband to a
divorce." The reason for this distinction between husband and wife
has been thus stated: "The offense is a social as well as a moral one,
and it is agreed by the civilians to be less grievous to the sufferer,
though not less immoral, when it is committed by the husband, whose
transgression cannot impose a suppositious offspring on the wife,
than it is when committed by the wife, whose transgression may im-
pose such an offspring on the husband; and hence it probably was,
though the kindred fault of barrenness was also cause of divorce, that
the right of repudiation was confined in the primitive ages to the
husband; for there is no instance of an exercise of it by a wife till
the time of Cicero or shortly before it. '""
1'69 U. Pa. Law Rev. 76 (1920-21).
"Supra, Note 17.
"Burns v. Burns, 60 Ind. 259 (1877).
0 Dictum in Keats v. Keats, 1 S. W. & Tr. 334 (1858).
"Supra, Note 1.
"2 Bishop, Marriage and Divorce, 6th Ed., Sec. 5, p. 3.
"Wilson v. Wilson, 154 Mass. 194, 28 N. E. 167 (1891); Engle v.
Engle, 153 Iowa 285, 133 N. W. 654 (1911).
"Williams v. Williams, 136 Ky. 71, 123 S. W. 337 (1909); Baker v.
Baker, 136 Ky. 617, 124 S. W. 866 (1910).
" Booth v. Booth, 12 Ky. L. Rep. 988 (1891).
'Baker v. Baker, supra, Note 24.
"Kentucky Statutes (1930), Section 2117.
Cooper's Notes to Justinian, Lib. 1, Tit. 9, Section 1, p. 435.
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In this state, to entitle a wife to a divorce on the grounds of her
husband's adultery, it is not necessary to prove him guilty beyond a
reasonable doubt, but only to establish his adulterous relations by the
weight of the evidence and to the satisfaction of the chancellor.:*
This distinction made by the Kentucky statutes between husband
and wife as to the number of acts of guilt necessary to constitute
adultery is without foundation. The modern tendency of the law is
to treat the husband and wife as if they stood on equal footing. No
longer is it the policy of the law to treat the wife as if she were a
part of the personal property of the husband. She is entitled to the
same degree of conjugal respect that he is. The law should not be
relaxed in favor of the wife, but made stricter in regard to the husband
so as to hold both to the same standard of conjugal loyalty to each
other and require both to obey God's commandment.
Surely some future general assembly will see the light and abolish
this unjust discrimination, thus following the example of forty-two
other states in dealing impartially with those who plight their mutual
faith at the altar.
WnIAM S. JETT, Js.
GIFTS: RECOVERY OF ENGAGEMENT RING ON BREAKING OF
ENGAGEMENT TO MARRY.
M gave W an engagement ring in consideration of her promise to
marry him; at the same time each agreed and promised to marry the
other. Approximately two years later M informed W of his unwilling-
ness to perform his part of the contract and refused to marry her.
A few days later while M and W were together, W took the ring
from her finger and M took it from her hand and put it in his pocket.
W demanded that the ring be returned to her possession, but M re-
fused. W sued to recover the ring, if M still had it, or, if not, its
value. Held, that the plaintiff was the owner of the ring and was
entitled to it, or its value if the defendant did not have it.'
After a consideration of the problem as raised and decided in
various cases the court concluded that where the donee breaches the
contract, the donor has a right to recover any property or money
which the donee received from the donor "in consideration of the
marriage contract." The court went on to say that although the
marriage contract may be supported by the promise of one to marry
the other, i. e., the mutual promise of the parties, yet if the parties
choose to promise or pay an additional consideration they will be
bound thereby in the same manner as if it had been an ordinary com-
mercial contract, for in modern ages the ring has become a part of
the real consideration of the contract and can no longer be considered
a mere custom or symbol. The court believed that the ring could be
likened unto purchase money, or "earnest" money in a commercial
"0 Supra, Note 24.
'Schultz v. Duitz, 253 Ky. 135, 69 S. W. (2d) 27, 92 A. L. R. 600
(1934).
